The many Yevgeny Prigozchins

Yevgeny Prigozchin, a key figure in the Kremlin and known warlord, erupted in anger after months of conflict with the Defense Ministry over control of the war.

Holding the military responsible for a missile attack on his mercenary troops, Prigozchin effortlessly seized Rostov, a strategic point in the invasion of Ukraine. His goal seemed to be the arrest of Defense Minister Shoigú, who managed to escape just in time. Then, Prigozchin’s Wagner mercenary units pressed towards Moscow via Voronezh, taking down aircraft as they went. Cities hastily prepared defenses against this unexpected threat. However, by evening, just 200 km from Moscow, Prigozchin shocked everyone by announcing a sudden truce and pulling his troops back, marking one of the strangest chapters in the Ukraine invasion.

Analyst Rob Lee aptly described it as an “internal feud” that morphed into a public challenge, only to find a temporary resolution with Prigozchin’s internal exile to Belarus and his criminal group’s subordination to the military.

A week after Putin’s most significant challenge in his 24-year reign over Russia, several questions linger. Why would the leader of a Kremlin-backed private army dare to march towards Moscow? Why was he able to capture the Russian headquarters in Rostov so effortlessly and then pull back so close to the capital? What are the broader implications of this coup on the battleground and its geopolitical implications? And what does this mean for Putin political stability? Moreover, how secure is the world’s largest nuclear arsenal?

I am not a specialist, but rather a concerned observer, deeply affected by the brutal invasion of Ukraine, both from a human and geopolitical perspective. After reading through different viewpoints from academics, public intellectuals, and journalists, I would like to share are my preliminary conclusions about the Prigozchin affair.

The coup that wasn’t quite a coup

Experts agree that Prigozchin’s challenge to the Kremlin is one of the most significant Putin has ever faced. Still, there are debates about what to label it: a coup, rebellion, uprising, or mutiny?

Beyond this labelling debate, it’s essential to understand how is Putin reading this and the implications on both the battlefield and Russia’s internal politics. The next few days might shed light on Putin’s take, especially if, perhaps, Prigozchin were to meet a tragic and suspicious accident.

The coup seemed more performative than actually political: It lacked public support, military alliances, and a clear plan of attack on Moscow. In this respect, it’s reminiscent of the Trump-driven insurrection on January 6th, 2021 in the U.S.

In my view, the coup’s performative nature reveals it basically as a political communication exercise to resolve an internal elite power dispute. It is eloquently indicative of the bizarre neo-feudal governance model that is Putin’s rule.

The “March for Justice”

In 2023, the only notable Russian “victory” was in Bakhmut, achieved by Wagner at a high cost. Leveraging this “victory,” Prigozchin attempted to gain greater control over the war’s direction.

The nature of the war shifted from a limited “Special Military Operation” to a proxy war against the West. In this new context, Wagner’s role also changed from being a hybrid war tool to a formal combat force. It’s no surprise then that they eventually clashed with the Defense Ministry.

Suddenly, Prigozchin became politically active, recalling forces from Africa and Syria to the Ukrainian front. He began recruiting from prison colonies, offering freedom and education in exchange for military service. His rhetoric charged against the Putin elite, highlighting the disparity between the rich oligarchs and the common soldiers. This gave him some popularity among the troops and segments of the population.

However, his speech’s core message was about justice - but Justice after ensuring that his faction within the elite received its due share. He called his uprising as the “March for Justice,” but “Justice” based rather on criminal ethics than the law.

In his discourses, Prigozchin dismantled the false narratives about the invasion’s reasons, presenting the real motivation as the plundering of Ukraine’s economic resources and its distribution among the Russian oligarchy.

Despite all this, Prigozchin’s revolutionary message found little resonance in a depoliticized space. This absence of mass support for Putin suggests that his popularity rests more on the lack of political alternatives than any genuine popular support.

The episode exposed in general the “collective” Putin, where Lukashenko seems included, which was previously unknown to us. The collective Putin seems to have replaced the individual Putin: while none of the elite supported Wagner, none moved against Prigozchin either.

Understanding the truth behind the invasion can unload some tensions, especially concerning Russian propaganda narratives.

Prigozchin’s criticism of the war made him a potential candidate for peace negotiations, even with the avail of Western powers. This raises questions about Western intelligence’s decision not to intervene, in spite of knowing in advance of Prigozchin’s plans. Did they hope to find a negotiator to end this absurd war?

However speculative, these thoughts present an interesting dimension to how Prigozchin might be viewed in history.

A Coup Without a Conspiracy

However, Prigozhin’s call to arms found no resonance in a politically disengaged landscape. Unlike 1991 when Muscovites took to the streets to defend Gorbachev’s Perestroika, or in a parallel universe, when the people of West Caracas supported Chávez during the 2002 coup, no such defense of Putin was seen.

This hints that Putin’s popularity might be more about the absence of political alternatives than genuine mass support. In this context, Prigozhin’s actions have unveiled a dimension of the “Collective Putin”, which includes figures like Lukashenko, previously unbeknownst to us. Initially, we saw Putin on TV, talking about severe punishments for traitors, civil wars, backstabbing, and referencing the 1917 revolution. Yet, by day’s end, this image shifted to something resembling a mafia-style negotiation. The “Collective Putin” seemed to overshadow Putin himself: none of the elites voiced support for Wagner, yet no steps were taken to arrest Prigozhin either. Even Kadyrov’s Chechens arrived in Rostov but didn’t intervene to quell the uprising. In this “Collective Putin”, there seemed little appetite for infighting.

If the collapse of a governance system is marked by uncontrollable popular street pressures or clear divisions within the ruling elite, none of this was visible during Prigozhin’s mutiny.

Is Putin weakened? Contrary to Western media narratives, I find it unproductive to dwell on whether the rebellion weakens Putin.

It seems this debate treats power as a commodity; a tangible, quantifiable asset to be stockpiled and wielded as needed. However, this view doesn’t capture the true essence and dynamics of power.

In my eyes, the real question is whether the Prigozhin event paves the way for other coup attempts.

Once again, I draw parallels with Venezuela: Chávez’s triumph over the 2002 coup attempt and the oil sabotage later that year, allowed him to solidify his power, purging the armed forces of coup plotters and rooting out saboteurs.

Contrary to the predominant opinion in Western media, my perspective as a mere observer is that Putin will maneuver similarly: patching up the system’s leaks to prevent a repeat, especially if the war doesn’t go his way. He has the backing of the armed forces, security services, and intelligence firmly by his side.

Sam Greene notes in his newsletter that in neo-patrimonial regimes, such incidents tend to solidify leaders’ power rather than weaken them. I don’t see it being any different with Putin.

This doesn’t mean the incident won’t influence the war’s end. The war will conclude when internal pressures in Russia dictate so.

Just as the U.S. exited Vietnam due to internal pressures, Prigozhin’s mutiny will be looked back upon as the first, but not the last, of the signs of mounting internal pressures in Russia to end the invasion. The war’s conclusion will come from within Russia.

However, the war’s end doesn’t necessarily spell Putin’s end. While the mutiny may be seen as a sign of decay, it doesn’t, as some are quick to predict, signify the system’s end.